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Abstract
“Waste not want not” expresses our culture’s aversion to waste. “I could have gotten the same
thing for less” is a sentiment that can diminish pleasure in a transaction. We study people’s will-
ingness to “pay” to avoid this spoiler. In one scenario, participants imagined they were looking
for a rental apartment, and had bought a subscription to an apartment listing. If a cheaper sub-
scription had been declined, respondents preferred not to discover post hoc that it would have
sufﬁced. Speciﬁcally, they preferred ending their quest for the ideal apartment after seeing more,
rather than fewer, apartments, so that the length of the search exceeds that available within the
cheaper subscription. Other scenarios produced similar results. We conclude that people may
sometimes prefer to be wasteful in order to avoid feeling wasteful.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D03, M31
Keywords: waste aversion; mental accounting; violation of dominance; counterfactual; regret
1 Introduction
Recently, one of our friends was upset. She had
just rented a perfect little apartment, advertised
on a campus bulletin board. “But”, she said, “I
had just paid a non-refundable fee for an apart-
ments listing. Now I feel like a freier” (a Yid-
dish word, roughly meaning patsy, sucker, or
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pushover).
Spending more money than necessary is re-
garded as wasteful. When not intentional, and
easily avoidable, it can make one feel like a
freier. Admittedly, sometimes people over-
spenddeliberately. People showofftheirwealth
by shopping in wildly expensive places. Oth-
ers ﬂaunt their disregard for money by lighting
up cigars with $20 bills. People also choose
to be generous, giving expensive gifts, throw-
ing elaborate parties, tipping ostentatiously, etc.
Extravagance is not to be equated with waste.
But when actions are self-deﬁned as wasteful,
the feeling of wastefulness can be as aversive, if
not more, than the waste itself.
Mental accounting (Thaler, 1999) provides a
1
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useful framework for understanding waste. If
you want a new pair of jeans, $500 is wasteful.
But if you want Prada jeans, $500 may be a bar-
gain. To please your hosts, a $30 wine may be
adequate. But to impress them, you should lay
out more. When you open a mental account,
and enter a debit, you can judge for yourself
whether the resulting outcome was “worth it”.
But mentalaccounting does not explain whythe
feeling of waste is so aversive.
Arkes, an expert on the psychology of waste
(Arkes, 1996; Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Arkes &
Ayton, 1999; Arkes & Hutzel, 1997), has de-
ﬁned waste in two ways. First, as mentioned
above, a person is said to be wasteful if she
“spends more money on an item than is nec-
essary”. Second, the other side of waste is to
“utilizethe item that has been purchased” insuf-
ﬁciently (Arkes, 1996, p. 214). Arkes identiﬁed
several behaviors driven by waste aversion.
1. Students who had received an unex-
pected discount when purchasing their the-
ater subscription ultimately attended fewer
plays; “waste” isgreater when theplay for-
gone is more expensive (Arkes & Blumer,
1985).
2. Respondents predicted that after buying 2
movie tickets for $5 each, one would be
less inclined to pay $5 for a third movie
if one had earlier rejected a $12 deal for
a 3-pack. Paying $5 for what could have
cost $2 feels wasteful(Arkes, 1996, Exper-
iment 1).
3. Respondents indicated they would be more
likely to buy a new upgraded $80 item if
their old one could be traded at purchase
for a $30 rebate, than if the new item were
simply reduced from $80 to $50. The old
item seems “wasted” in the sale case, but
“put to gooduse”in therebatecase (Arkes,
1996, Experiment 2).
Waste is contrary to one’s economic self-
interest, and oftimes even considered immoral,
so trying to avoid it is natural. Arkes showed,
moreover, that even “to avoid the appearanceof
wastefulness [italics ours] people may be mo-
tivated to make choices that compromise their
own self-interest (1996, p. 213)”. Spending
too much hurts the pocket. Appearing to have
spent too much hurts the ego. People may will-
ingly overpay in economic currencies to reduce
psychological costs. However, losses that are
not one’s “own fault” (due, e.g., to theft, acci-
dent, or market behavior) are not accompanied
by this second-order pain. Thus, people may
also prefer to tolerate additional expenditures
(of time, effort, pain, discomfort, etc.), if only
to avoid the psychological costs of feeling that
they wasted their money.
The present study extends waste aversion to
scenarios where not only self-interest is vio-
lated, but dominance is violated as well — pro-
vided that can save one from feeling like a
freier. Study 1 establishes the phenomenon,
namely that, in order to avoid feeling that
money was wasted people prefer an outcome
thatdeliversthesameresult,butrequiresgreater
expenditure of effort, time or discomfort, and is
therefore dominated.
Study 2 extends the results by introducing
new dependent variables and manipulating the
proximity of the protagonist. Study 3 replicates
the results with a new population of participants
and examines the relations between the prefer-
ences for a dominated outcome established in
the previous studies and reported feelings of
waste and regret.
2 Study 1
Two scenarios were created, describing a pro-
tagonist who had chosen to pay a ﬁxed amount
for the successful completion of some goal over
paying according to the actual amount of ser-
vice needed to reach the goal. In each sce-
nario, we offered two possible outcomes, dif-
fering with regard to whether the ﬁxed amount
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Table 1: The scenarios of Study 1.
Dentist scenario
Sharon decided towhiten his teeth. Thedentist told him that the treatment is not painful, and that
he cannot predict exactly how many appointments will be required to achieve the desired outcome.
Most people require between 5 and 8 appointments of 30 minutes each (an identical treatment is
administered in each appointment). A single appointment costs 400NIS, and one can make them
one after another, until attaining the desired outcome: permanently white sparkling teeth.
The clinic also offers a package deal, where you prepay 2200NIS, for as many appointments as
needed, until attaining the desired outcome. Payment is non-refundable.
Sharon decided to choose the package deal.
After paying 2200NIS, which outcome, in your opinion, would Sharon prefer?
a. To ﬁnd that he reached his desired goal after 5 treatments (which, if he hadn’t prepaid, would
have cost him 200NIS less).
b. To ﬁnd that he reached his desired goal after 6 treatments (which, if he hadn’t prepaid, would
have cost him 200NIS more).
Van rental scenario
Amit is moving to a new apartment. His car is too small to haul his apartment’s contents, so he
rented a small van, allowing him to move his belongings himself, thereby saving money. The owner
charges by the hour. The ﬁrst 2 hours (the minimum) cost 120NIS, and every additional hour, or
part thereof, costs 50NIS. An alternative deal is to pay 400NIS for an entire day (up to 12 hours).
This payment is in advance, and non-refundable.
Amit decided to hire the van for an entire day.
After he paid 400NIS, which of the following 2 outcomes, in your opinion, would Amit prefer?
a. To ﬁnd that he ﬁnished the job and managed to return the van within 7 hours (which, without
the deal, would have cost him 30NIS less).
b. Toﬁnd that he ﬁnished the job and managed to return the van within 7.5 hours (which, without
the deal, would have cost him 20NIS more)?
Note: Italicized text appeared in one condition, and was missing in the other condition. The original Hebrew
questionnaire is available from the authors upon request.
turned out, after the fact, to be less or more
expensive than the pay-per-use. The services
werevanhireforhousemovinganddentaltreat-
ment, chosen speciﬁcally because both involve
some unpleasant investment of time and effort.
Having to spend more time and effort in order
to achieve some desired outcome justiﬁes the
prior decision to pay a ﬁxed sum. Contrarily,
the swift completion of the task might create
the feeling of wastefulness, as the protagonist
feels like a freier for not having paid accord-
ing to post-hoc actual use of the service. How-
ever, when a cheaper deal was never available,
there is no feeling of wastefulness, so that wast-
ing time and effort does not help to alleviate the
feeling of wasted money.
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2.1 Method
Participants and procedure. 137 students, 37%
women, mean age 25. 86 students in 2 class-
rooms were asked to answer a short question-
naire just before exiting. 51 others were ap-
proached individually. Two prizes of 250NIS
were promised, to be awarded by lottery.
Design and materials. We showed respon-
dents the two scenarios presented in Table 1.
The manipulated variable within each scenario
was whether it did or did not mention a cheaper,
albeit rejected, deal, italicized in Table 1. Re-
spondents were assigned at random to a sce-
nario and to an experimental condition.
The compared outcomes were deliberately
close, both in terms of difference (consecu-
tive integers, half an hour) and in terms of ra-
tios (e.g., 7.5 hours is only 7% longer than
7 hours). We clearly stated that the goals
were fully achieved (the teeth were “sparkling
white”, and the mover has “ﬁnished the job”).
Yet, it was absolutely transparent which choice
accomplishes the desired outcome faster. Thus,
the longer outcome is dominated by the quicker
outcome.
2.2 Results and discussion
Results appear in Figure 1. A 3-way log-linear
analysis yields signiﬁcant results with regard to
the main independent variable. Overall, 64.2%
of the respondents chose the option that appears
less “wasteful” — but involves a higher expen-
diture of resources! — when a cheaper deal had
been rejected (partial χ2(1) = 20.1, p < .001).
The two scenarios differed (and why wouldn’t
they?), with the Dentist scenario eliciting a sig-
niﬁcantly higher proportion of preference for
the dominated outcome (57.4%) than the Van
rental (33.3%) (partial χ2(1) = 8.78, p < .005).
Yet, thereisnointeractionbetweenthetwovari-
ables (partial χ2(1) = .633, p = .426), and the
same conclusion can be drawn based on both
scenarios: If only one subscription exists, its
Figure 1: Percent of respondents predicting
preference for the wasteful outcome in Study 1





















No other deal oﬀered
Cheaper deal rejected
cost isjust acost. But a cheaper yet adequateal-
ternative presents a concrete counterfactual (“If
only I’d taken it!”), exacerbating waste aver-
sion. It is worth noting that the non-negligible
proportion of participants indicating preference
forthedominatedoutcomeevenwhentherewas
no other option available can be explained by
the second deﬁnition of waste described in the
introduction. Namely, the longer outcome rep-
resents a more extensive or full utilization of
what was purchased.
3 Study 2
In order to test the robustness of the results of
Study 1, we administered new questionnaires to
a different group of participants. We extended
the design in three aspects. First, we introduced
two new scenarios. Second, whereas in Study
1 we asked about a stranger, in the new study
we manipulated the identity of the protagonist
to be either the respondent or a friend. Peo-
pleare sometimesmore willingto attributenon-
normative behavior and attitudes to others than
to themselves (Fisher, 1993), or even exagger-
ate non-normative behavior when attributed to
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others (Jo, 2000). On the other hand, when peo-
ple are asked to predict decisions made by oth-
ers, they underestimate the effect of emotions
on the decision (Faro & Rottenstreich, 2006, cf.
fMRIevidenceobtainedbyGreeneetal., 2001).
Therefore, the new scenarios test whether the
effect is mitigated or enhanced due to proxim-
ity when brought “closer to home”. Finally, we
introduced two new dependent variables, ask-
ing what the respondent “wishes for”, or what
would make the protagonist “happy”, to test
whether the effect depends on the speciﬁc fram-
ing used to elicit preferences. By manipulat-
ing the target person and by asking about emo-
tions such as happiness, we are able to learn
about the role of emotions in mediating the ef-
fect of wasteful feelings. Speciﬁcally, if the ef-
fect mainly depends on the emotional state, the
effect observed for the existence of the previ-
ously rejected cheaper option would alter as the
other two independent variables change.
3.1 Method
Participants and procedure. 302 Israeli stu-
dents, 70% women, mean age 30, were re-
cruited informally among our acquaintances.
They volunteered a few minutes of their time
to answer a short questionnaire. Participants,
approached individually, were handed a ques-
tionnaire consisting of two questions, one from
each scenario, and responded on the spot.
Design and materials. We showed respon-
dents both scenarios presented in Table 2. As
in Study 1, each either did or did not mention a
cheaper, albeit rejected, deal. Two further ma-
nipulations, italicized in Table 2, were used to
complete a 2 (whether or not a cheaper sub-
scription was available) -by-2 (whether partic-
ipants were asked which outcome would make
one happier, or which outcome was wished for)
-by-2 (whether the preference queried about
was one’s own or a friend’s) design.
Respondents were assigned at random to one
cell within the ﬁrst scenario, and to its com-
plementary cell (namely, the one with the com-
plementary value on all three independent vari-
ables) in the second. Scenario order was ran-
domized.
As in Study 1, The compared outcomes were
deliberately close, while it was made clear that
the goals were achieved without compromise
(the apartment found was “perfect”, and the
body was “hair-free forever”).
3.2 Results and discussion
Table 3 shows the results. A 4-way log-linear
analysis tested the four main effects (three ma-
nipulated factors + scenario factor), the three
2-way interactions for the manipulated factors,
and their 3-way interaction.1
The scenario factor was not statistically sig-
niﬁcant, nor were its interactions with otherfac-
tors(p-valuesbetween .242and .933). Sincethe
two scenarios yielded such similar results, Fig-
ure 2 combines them.
The data fully replicate the results of Study
1. The largest effect is whether a cheaper op-
tion had been rejected. Thirty-seven percent of
respondents chose the dominated outcome af-
ter this rejection, but only 11% otherwise (par-
tial χ2(1) = 58.7, p < .001). Once again, the
prior availability of a cheaper deal makes the
outcome that is, in fact, less wasteful contribute
to the feeling of wastefulness, and therefore less
attractive.
Furthermore, the effect is robust to the ma-
nipulations of target variable and identity of
the protagonist. While the two variables have
signiﬁcant effects on the option chosen by re-
spondents, the interaction with the effect under
1This analysis necessarily treats each response as in-
dependent, thus neglecting the subject identity, which
may result in a loss of power. Similar analyses performed
separately for the two scenarios provide essentially the
same results as the analysis reported here, indicating that
the dependency between the two scenarios did not affect
the statistical tests.
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Table 2: The scenarios of Study 2, with either one deal or two deals offered.
Rental-apartments scenario
[Only one deal offered] You are / Your friend is looking for a rental apartment. You know /
Your friend knows exactly what you are / he is looking for. You have / he has decided to take out a
subscription for an Internet rental-apartments listing. A subscription costs 180NIS for 20 sessions
on the data base. What would make you / him happier / What would you wish for yourself / him?
a. To ﬁnd the perfect apartment after 10 sessions (going out to see one apartment following each
session).
b. To ﬁnd the perfect apartment after 11 sessions (going out to see one apartment following each
session).
[Cheaper deal rejected] You are / Your friend is looking for a rental apartment. You know / Your
friend knows exactly what you are / he is looking for. You have / he has decided to take out a
subscription for an Internet rental-apartments listing. A subscription costs 100NIS [then about $25]
for 10 sessions, or 180NIS for 20 sessions. After some deliberation, you / he opted to pay 180NIS
for 20 sessions on the data base. What would make you / him happier / What would you wish for
yourself / him?
a. To ﬁnd the perfect apartment after 10 sessions (going out to see one apartment following each
session).
b. To ﬁnd the perfect apartment after 11 sessions (going out to see one apartment following each
session).
Permanent depilation scenario
[Only one deal offered] Three months before the onset of summer, you / your friend decided to
remove your / her body hair permanently by laser in a cosmetic center. You / She prepaid 1500NIS
for 10 laser treatments at the center. What would make you / her happier / What would you wish for
yourself / her?
a. A smooth hair-free body forever after 7 treatments.
b. A smooth hair-free body forever after 8 treatments.
[Cheaper deal rejected] Three months before the onset of summer, you / your friend decided
to remove your / her body hair permanently by laser in a cosmetic center. The center offers two
packages: either prepay 1500NIS for 10 treatments, or prepay 1200NIS for 7 treatments. After
some deliberation, you / she prepaid 1500NIS for 10 laser treatments at the center. What would
make you / her happier / What would you wish for yourself / her?
a. A smooth hair-free body forever after 7 treatments.
b. A smooth hair-free body forever after 8 treatments.
Note: Italicized text was manipulated between conditions. The original Hebrew questionnaire is available
from the authors upon request.
study here is not signiﬁcant (partial χ2(1) < 1,
p > .400 in all cases).
A signiﬁcant main effect was found for
whether respondents were asked what would
make one happier, or what they would wish
for. 33% chose the dominated outcome in the
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Table 3: Percent of respondents, among the total in that cell, choosing the dominated outcome in
Study 2.
“What would you wish for?” “What would make one happier?”
Oneself Friend Oneself Friend
Seeking a rental apartment
% N % N % N % N
No other deal offered 5.3 38 6.5 46 11.4 35 14.6 41
Cheaper deal rejected 25.0 36 16.7 30 46.7 30 60.9 46
Removing body hair
% N % N % N % N
No other deal offered 6.5 46 10.0 30 10.0 30 22.2 36
Cheaper deal rejected 24.4 41 25.7 35 30.4 46 57.9 38
Figure 2: Percent of respondents choosing the
dominated outcome in the different experimen-
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former case, but only 15% in the latter (par-
tial χ2(1) = 24.7, p < .001). Possibly, an
emotion such as happiness tolerates violation
of dominance better than an expressed desider-
atum. Whereas happiness doesn’t seem to re-
quire a normative justiﬁcation, one feels more
accountable, and held to higher standards, re-
garding what one endorses. However, the lack
ofsigniﬁcant interactionshowsthat theeffect of
thefeeling of wastedrivenby thecounterfactual
comparison to the rejected option remain unaf-
fected.
Whether the question was about oneself or a
friend was also signiﬁcant (20% chose the dom-
inated outcome for themselves, versus 28% for
their friend, partial χ2(1) = 5.39, p < .05).
Again, no signiﬁcant interaction with our pri-
mary independent variable was found.
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between
the last two variables (partial χ2(1) = 3.94,
p < .05), whereby self versus friend mattered
only with regard to predicting happiness, while
regarding what one would wish for, responses
are similar for oneself and for a friend. Per-
haps two intuitions clash here. Inasmuch as
participants are aware which choice is rational,
social desirability might make them reluctant
to openly admit the appeal of the dominated
outcome. Asking about a friend could solicit
less guarded responses. Indeed, 40% thought
their friend would be happier with the dom-
inated outcome, but only 25% admitted they
themselves would be happier with it. On the
other hand, if asked what they wish for, they
might feel a moral obligation to wish “the right
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thing” for a friend, even if it wouldn’t necessar-
ily make him/her happier — and a dominated
outcome is hardly “the right thing”. Indeed,
nearly the same proportion wished the dominat-
ing outcomefor themselves(85%), and for their
friend (86%). Thus, we ﬁnd that our manipula-
tionshad asigniﬁcanteffect onchoicesmadeby
respondents, and at the same time did not inﬂu-
ence the effect of feeling of waste, which is our
main interest in this study. We conclude that,
although emotions do play a role in the type
of scenarios that we investigate, the waste aver-
sion manifested in the reduced attractiveness of
the dominant outcome does not depend on the
elicited emotions.
4 Study 3
Having rejected a cheaper deal makes the more
efﬁcient outcome appear to be wasteful and
leads to a preference for the dominated out-
come. As Arkes (1996)pointsout, wastefulness
may include a component of regret. The domi-
nated outcome triggers counterfactual compari-
sonto“whatwouldhavehappenedhadtheother
option been accepted,” which would have re-
sulted in a better outcome. Conversely, without
an alternative option, no counterfactual com-
parison arises. Thus, waste aversion is closely
linkedto the well-studiedphenomenonofregret
aversion (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982;
Ritov, 1996; Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelen-
berg et al., 1997).
Study 3 was conducted to investigate the
roles of subjective feelings of waste and regret
in the observed effect. We repeated the design
of Study 1 using the Van rental scenario, ask-
ing participants to estimate the feeling of waste-
fulness and feeling of regret associated with
the more efﬁcient outcome. This measurement
serves multiple purposes: First, as a manipu-
lation check, we test that feeling of waste is
affected by our manipulation as hypothesized.
Second, we test whether the preference for the
dominated outcome is correlated with feeling
of waste within conditions. Lastly, we look
at whether reported feeling of regret mediates
feeling of waste and outcome preferences.
4.1 Method
Participants and procedure. Ninety four partic-
ipants, 52% women, mean age 23 from the par-
ticipantpooloftheMax Planck InstituteofEco-
nomics in Jena, Germany were recruited by e-
mail using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Six prizes
of 50e each were promised, to be awarded by
lottery.2
Design and materials. The experiment was
conducted online using LimeSurvey (Schmitz,
2010). Participants were given the second sce-
nario of Table 1 with the following changes:
The Israeli name Amit was changed to Chris-
tian. Hourly Van rental prices were 20e for the
ﬁrst 2 hours and 8e for each additional hour, or
part thereof. Renting the van for a full day cost
65e. The possible outcomes were 7 or 8 hours,
respectively. In line with the previous studies,
respondents were asked which outcome would
be preferred by the protagonist. Next, respon-
dents were presented with the following ques-
tions on a separate screen: “If Christian ﬁnds
that the job required 7 hours, would he feel that
he wasted money?” and “If Christian ﬁnds that
the job required 7 hours, would he regret having
hired the van for the full day?” Both questions
appeared simultaneously on the same screen,
in this order, and responses were given on a
7-points Likert scale.3 Respondents were ran-
domly allocated to the two experimental con-
ditions, namely whether a cheaper option was
rejected or not.
2The lottery included 192 additional participants who
participated in parallel studies.
3The original German questionnaire is available from
the authors upon request.
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4.2 Results and discussion
The results of Study 1 were replicated with the
German respondents. 72% (33/46) of the sub-
jects chose the wasteful option in the presence
of a rejected cheaper deal, compared to 35%
(17/48) in the control condition (Fisher’s ex-
act test, p < .001). As hypothesized, having
rejected a cheaper option enhanced the “feel-
ing of waste” from 2.98 to 4.00, on average
(t(92) = 2.95, p < .005). However, the “feel-
ing of regret” did not differ between conditions
(3.56 vs. 3.83, t(92) = .73, p = .466), although
“waste”and “regret”are signiﬁcantlycorrelated
over conditions (r(94) = .57, p < .001).
We ﬁnd that feeling of waste is more impor-
tant than feeling of regret in inducing prefer-
ence for the dominated outcome. In fact, re-
gret does not predict outcome preference once
feeling of waste is accounted for, as is evi-
dent in the logistic regression reported in Ta-
ble 4. The probability of indicating preference
for the dominated outcome increases with the
“feeling of waste” that accompanies the more
efﬁcient outcome (Wald = 6.35, p < .05)
and with the existence of the alternative option
(Wald = 6.92, p < .01), but not the “feeling of
regret” (Wald = .01, p = .935).4
This supports our earlier interpretation: the
dominated outcome sometimes appears more
attractive precisely because the alternative ap-
pears wasteful. When a previously rejected
cheaper option exists, the feeling of waste and
therefore the attractiveness of the dominated
outcome both increase.
Regret, however, was not found to mediate
the effect of feeling of waste on outcome pref-
erence in our data, although it indeed appears
to be a component of waste, as hypothesized by
Arkes (1996).
4Thesigniﬁcanteffectoftheconditionis notinconsis-
tent with feeling of waste as a mediating variable, since
the measurement of feeling of waste is on an arbitrary
scale and may be sensitive to the condition.
Table 4: Logistic regression predicting pre-
ferred outcome based on “feeling of waste”,
“feeling of regret” and condition in Study 3.
95% CI for exp b
B
(SE)



















.935 0.70 0.99 1.38
R2 = .174 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .214 (Cox &
Snell), .286 (Nagelkerke), Model χ2(1) = 22.65.
5 General discussion
This paper adds a new type to “irrational”
choices motivated by waste aversion. To avoid
the feeling of wasted money (feeling! not real
waste), people express willingness to expend
extra resources — itself a waste. Speciﬁcally,
after rejecting a cheaper deal, most respondents
saw the appeal of an outcome that voids the re-
grettable “if only” counterfactual — even if it is
wasteful. This paradoxical phenomenon is po-
tentiallyrelevant to customersatisfaction when-
ever a prix-ﬁxe scheme is offered, and therefore
is likely to be prevalent across many products
and services.
How, one may ask, can a dominated outcome
feel less wasteful? Perhaps because the cur-
rency in which people felt wasteful is money,
whereas the currency paid to hide it is time and
effort. Contrary to the common adage, time is
not always like money. For various reasons, it
is more ambiguous (Soman, 2001), and more
ﬂexibly priced (Okada & Hoch, 2004).
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Thaler (1980) suggested that prepaying for
a subscription (to a concert series, a gym, or
cooking classes) encourages more use than if
payment were per use. Thus subscriptions can
be a self-control device that people adopt will-
ingly, harnessing waste aversion to their ad-
vantage. The present ﬁndings cannot be ap-
plied similarly. Presumably nobody would ac-
tually make one more appointment (with the
dentist, say) if they are convinced it is unneces-
sary (namely that their teeth will get no whiter).
While many of our respondents acknowledged
the appeal of a dominated outcome, we doubt
they would actually choose a wasteful action
just to affect it. It is one thing to wish to ﬁnd
oneself in some circumstance, and quite an-
other to bring it about. The latter requires self-
deception, in addition to waste aversion, so that
the person wrongly believes the wasteful action
not to be wasteful (see, e.g., Gur & Sackeim,
1979; Mele, 1997). People sometimes engage
in what observers would call self-deception, but
successful self-deception requires that the self
not be aware of it (Quattrone & Tversky, 1984).
Our phenomenon is related to the sunk-cost
fallacy. The prototypical sunk-cost effect in-
volvesapreference forA overB(e.g., drivingto
a ballgame versus watching it at home on TV)
when one had made a non-refundable payment
for A, even though circumstances have changed
since payment was made (e.g., the weather is
foul and trafﬁc is impossible), so that B would
have been preferred to A in the absence of the
sunk cost (e.g., Thaler, 1980; Arkes & Blumer,
1985). Sunk-cost effects are weaker in one
sense, and stronger in another, than the present
effect.
Sunk-cost effects are weaker inasmuch as A
is not dominated by B. In fact, at the time pay-
ment was made, A had not only been preferred
to B, but even worth paying for. It is the change
in circumstance that changed the preference. In
our scenarios, on the other hand, one option
dominates another unequivocally, and only the
prepayment shifts preference to the dominated
outcome.
Sunk-cost effects are stronger than the
present effect inasmuchas they relatedirectlyto
behavior, and therefore can be observed in the
real world, such as when public projects whose
costs exceed expectation are pursued beyond a
point at which they would not have been under-
taken had a prior investment not already been
made.
In sunk-cost situations, people do not nec-
essarily accept the economic perspective which
urges them to ignore sunk costs and look ahead
only. In that sense, it seems more like an error
ofreasoning. In ourcase, however, itissotrans-
parent that one outcome dominates another that
the irrational choice cannot be attributed to er-
ror. Hence, people may wish they didn’t have to
confront having been freiers, but would just live
withit ifthey were, because self-deceit is nearly
impossible. We ourselves were quite surprised
that we could so easily lure a majority of re-
spondents into preferring a dominated outcome.
Minimizing waste is economically and
morally admirable, and not being a freier is
good for the soul. What is remarkable is what
people might sometimes prefer to endure rather
than face up to occasional waste or the sem-
blance thereof.
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